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OBSTACLES TO TAMING CORPORATE POLLUTERS: 
WATER POLLUTION POLITICS IN GARY, INDIANA 
By Edward Greer* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article attempts to explain why it has not been possible to 
solve the water pollution problem of Gary, Indiana.· Gary is an 
industrial city of 175,000 people, the majority of whom are black. 
Since 1968 the Mayor of Gary has been an insurgent black politi-
cian, Richard Gordon Hatcher. The City's economy is dominated by 
the Gary Works of the United States Steel Corporation, the coun-
try's largest integrated steel complex, whose annual capacity is 
eight million tons. Gary was originally built by U.S. Steel as a 
company town, and its impact on the local political scene continues 
to be pervasive.2 
Governmental efforts at all levels to abate the water pollution in 
Gary have come to an impasse, and this article seeks to analyze 
these efforts and the nature of the problem in context of the success-
ful campaign by U.S. Steel to avoid confronting the problem.3 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WATER POLLUTION IN GARY 
A. Early History 
Gary, Indiana is an exemplary case of industrial despoliation of 
the American environment. Its air pollution problem is evident to 
even the most casual traveler. Gary's water pollution problem, how-
ever, is even more severe and intractable. 
This was not always the case, however, for the City and the mam-
moth United States Steel Gary Works did not even exist before 
1906. In the late nineteenth century the area comprised two exclu-
sive hunting clubs of Chicago magnates. One of these clubs included 
among its members John W. Gates, President of Illinois Steel (one 
of the constituent parts of U.S. Steel), and Marshall Field, a found-
ing director of U.S. Steel. Field was instrumental in the decision to 
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build a new mill in the Chicago area, rather than in the traditional 
Pennsylvania region.4 The actual site decision was made by the 
chairman of the board, Judge Elbert Gary, and was based on a 
variety of factors (e.g., availability, price, transport, markets, a fa-
vorable state legislature, etc.)5 
Gaining the special acquiescence of the pliant Indiana state legis-
lature, U.S. Steel engaged in massive landfill into Lake Michigan, 
annihilating its natural state forever. 6 Radical changes were also 
wrought on the Grand Calumet River, which had meandered 
through Gary on what is now the demarcation between the Gary 
Works and the City proper. All of this was but a small part of the 
colossal engineering feat of building the world's largest steel mill 
and the city to support its work force. The Grand Calumet River was 
first surveyed in the 1830's and the original survey notes indicate 
that the River was wide and, although shallow, navigable. Until 
early in the twentieth century, lumber and fruit boats proceeded up 
the Grand Calumet from Lake Michigan and docked in Hammond, 
the city due west of Gary. There are pictures of three masted 
schooners docked at Hammond in 1905, but by 1910, after the con-
struction of the Gary Works, regular commercial navigations had 
ceased.7 
As a result of the Corporation's engineering, a public waterway in 
effect became the private property of U.S. Steel. The Grand Calu-
met River now flows westerly along the Corporation's property until 
it enters Indiana Harbor Canal. Indiana Harbor Canal, in turn, 
empties into Lake Michigan. Depending upon local weather condi-
tions, between a third and the entire flow of the Grand Calumet 
River enters Lake Michigan.s 
From the outset of its operations, the Gary Works has utilized the 
Grand Calumet River as a free disposal system for its unwanted 
chemical effluents. Before the Gary Works and the other large man-
ufacturing plants were built in the Calumet region, the Gary beach 
was the center of a major fishing industry. Large commercial 
catches of whitefish and sturgeon "were caught in nets which were 
pulled up out of the water by windlasses set up on the beach."9 
However, by the 1940's the fishing industry was destroyed. Algae 
growth in southern Lake Michigan (caused by industrial dumpings 
of large amounts of ammonia-nitrogen and phosphates) led to a 
collapse of the environment necessary to support fish populations. 10 
B. Current Problem 
Water pollution has become a severe problem in the United 
WATER POLLUTION POLITICS 201 
States only in the wake of the industrial expansion which followed 
the Second World War. II Industrial production is the main cause of 
water pollution in the United States. 12 13 (Although there are 
hundreds of thousands of manufacturing facilities, a small fraction 
of them - some 10,000 - utilize 90% of all industrial water.)14 Four 
industrial groups - petroleum, organic chemicals, pulp and paper, 
and primary metals - are responsible for over one half of all water 
pollution. 15 The primary metals group utilizes one third of all the 
water used by manufacturing,16 and the steel industry utilizes one 
fifthY 
The effluents of steel production are extremely damaging to the 
bodies of water into which they are dumped. Those rivers which 
receive major steel plant discharges are among the most polluted in 
the country,18 and the steel industry, whose rate of profits has sub-
stantially declined over the past decade, has been particularly re-
luctant to make the major capital investments necessary to amelio-
rate the problem. 19 
The overall result of the industrial growth in the post-war period 
has been to continually aggravate the nation's water pollution prob-
lem. 20 Notwithstanding the development of additional water pollu-
tion treatment facilities, the gross discharges by manufacturing 
firms into the nation's streams grew by 40% between 1957 and 
1971. 21 (In the steel industry, new technologies are tending to in-
crease "either the amount or the toxicity of water pollution.")22 
The causes and meaning of this phenomenon can best be seen by 
examining the activities of U.S. Steel's Gary Works, which has been 
the single largest polluter of Lake Michigan for decades. 23 Its dozens 
of sewers empty over 600 million gallons of water each day into the 
Grand Calumet and Lake Michigan,24 and the discharge of this 
water after its use in steelmaking processes has changed the Grand 
Calumet River downstream to the extent that its entire bottom "is 
composed of minute iron particles."25 The River is entirely unfit for 
any recreational activity. The ammonia-nitrogen discharged from 
the Gary Works is a major contributor to the eutrophication of 
southern Lake Michigan. 26 The cyanide level - due to a discharge 
of a ton every day from the steel mill - is perhaps sufficient to cause 
the death of anyone foolhardy enough to drink from the reddish 
brown water covered with oil slicks. 27 Not even sludge worms can 
live in the Grand Calumet; its only life is blue green algae. 28 
The impact of these effluent discharges extends into the Lake 
itself in the Calumet area. "Whereas in the clean bottom areas of 
Lake Michigan there are many kinds of organisms . . . this area 
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exhibits only a few kinds. Sludge worms and aquatic scuds are the 
most numerous, but bloodworms and fingernail clams are some-
times abundant."29 The Public Health Service has charged that the 
Gary Works is contributing to a practically irreversible pollution of 
the Lake. 
The fragmentary evidence available (monitoring .did not begin 
until the mid-1960's and is still grossly inadequate) strongly sug-
gests that discharges in every major category of effluent kept in-
creasing unti11968. In that year, new pollution control equipment 
sharply reduced the ammonia-nitrate and phenol discharges; but 
those of oil, iron particles and other solid particulates either stabi-
lized or continued to climb. In 1969 and 1970 there were apparently 
modest decreases in these discharges.3o 
In January, 1972, the Illinois Attorney General brought suit 
against the Gary Works, charging that it was still discharging 
104,000 pounds of metal and 35,000 pounds of oil daily.3t The most 
recent available data indicate that these fantastically high levels of 
effluent discharges are continuing today.32 
The discharges by the Gary Works do not exhaust the Corpora-
tion's damage to Lake Michigan's ecosystem. The Chicago South 
Works has had a very bad record as well; and even the U.S. Steel 
Waukegan facilities are a part of the problem.33 There are also ex-
ceptional "outbreaks" of huge discharges which take place at the 
steel mills on an intermittent basis. For example, on November 12, 
1971, the sewer at the Gary Works coke plant - which ordinarily 
discharges clean water - emitted an oil spill which caused a nine 
mile slick.34 
Furthermore, the giant fleet of ore ships which the corporation 
maintains on Lake Michigan to transport iron ore to the Gary Works 
periodically discharges oil into the Lake. Three fourths of the an-
nual 60 million tons of cargo docked in the Calumet are materials 
for the steel industry. 35 The impact of this is visible to the naked eye 
and, as the summer shipping season progresses, the Gary beaches 
have more and heavier oil slicks. 
In theory, the City of Gary, the State ofIndiana, and the federal 
government can each require that U.S. Steel stop using the Grand 
Calumet River as an open sewer. None of them have done so. 
II. IMPASSE OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL 
A. City of Gary 
In distinct contrast to the serious (albeit only moderately success-
ful) efforts of the administration of Mayor Richard Hatcher to con-
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trol Gary Works' air pollution, the city of Gary has taken no sub-
stantive action with respect to water pollution.36 Part of the reason 
is that while air pollution's impact is maximized in the immediate 
vicinity, Gary Works' water pollution affects the City less directly. 
When the City's water works were constructed by U.S. Steel engi-
neers between 1906 and 1908, they utilized the most advanced tech-
niques and the water works were constructed for an anticipated 
population of 200,000. (This plan was so farsighted that a second 
water works was not needed until the mid-1960's). The original 
water works has an intake tunnel which passes under the Gary 
Works and draws in water three miles from the Lake's shoreline. 37 
The prevailing water flow in southwestern Lake Michigan is from 
south to north in a westerly direction. Thus, the pollutants dis-
charged from the Gary Works (entering Lake Michigan west of the 
City at Indiana Harbor) do not pass into the City's own water sys-
tem. Instead, some three to four days after discharge they reach 
Chicago's water system. Consequently, although Gary's water has 
a high iron particle count which gives it an unpalatable taste, it is 
relatively safe for human consumption. 3s 
Indeed, until Richard Hatcher campaigned for Mayor in 1967, the 
question of water pollution had never been a public issue in local 
politics.:lU His program called for a local water pollution ordinance 
to be administered by a new local agency,40 but after his election 
nothing was done to implement this proposal. There were several 
apparent reasons for this inactivity. First, the Mayor did not control 
the Board of Health for his first three years of office; nor did he have 
a majority on the City Council throughout his first term. This lim-
ited his actual political power in this area quite severely. Second, 
the Administration's top aides and officials assigned a very low 
priority to Gary's water pollution. Third, there was no significant 
local political pressure for action on the matter; whatever environ-
mental reform energies existed in Gary were concentrated on the 
more acute problem of air pollution. Fourth, City Hall officials had 
a serious lack of knowledge about what was actually happening to 
the Grand Calumet. Finally, there was a tacit fear about engaging 
in controversy with U.S. Steel if it was at all avoidable. In large part 
this fear was based on the notion that pressure on the Corporation 
to clean up its water pollution might cause it to leave Gary and 
seriously injure the economy Y 
Such a fear was not without objective basis. The costs of major 
pollution control installations in older steel mills often playa signif-
icant role in management decisions to phase them out of produc-
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tion.42 And, in general, there is good reason for working class people 
(and the politicians who are sensitive to their felt needs) to suspect 
that they will wind up bearing the costs of environmental reforms. 43 
These considerations together created a climate of opinion in City 
Hall which was not conducive to vigorous initiatives in the area of 
water pollution abatement. 
There was, however, one tentative initiative in this area, taken 
after the Mayor was finally able, in January, 1971, to appoint a new 
Health Commissioner, Dr. Herschel Bornstein. Dr. Bornstein's first 
effort involved a request to the Indiana Stream Pollution Control 
Board to perform laboratory tests on water samples to be taken from 
the Grand Calumet to determine if there was a violation of state 
law. This request was refused on the grounds that this service was 
only performed for local Health Departments when drinking water 
samples were involved. 44 Soon thereafter, one of the key officials 
involved in this decision was appointed by another steel company 
as their Director of Environmental Control. 45 
Dr. Bornstein then attempted to proceed on his own and obtained 
a search warrant from the Gary City Court on June 24, 1971. Such 
an action was unprecedented in the City's entire history. Dr. Born-
stein arrived at the Gary Works with his warrant, took water sam-
ples from the Grand Calumet River, and sent them off for analysis 
to a private laboratory. Gary Works Superintendent J. David Carr 
angrily referred to the event as a "raid" and charged that it was a 
"carefully organized effort to create an incident."46 
Despite his action, Dr. Bornstein found himself in an impasse as 
neither the state nor federal authorities responded to his test results. 
The Mayor, too, did nothing to increase the Health Commissioner's 
legal powers so that he could effectively act on his own. 
Mayor Hatcher's 1971 campaign platform-which was published 
in April 1971, just prior to the "raid" - represented a step back-
ward from his previous pledge. The new platform only stated: "De-
velop a municipal ordinance [on water pollution] if it seems advis-
able .... "47 Apparently, he does not think that such an ordinance 
is advisable for, despite his new City Council majority, he has taken 
no action. Meanwhile, Health Commissioner Bornstein resigned, in 
part because he felt a lack of support for his initiatives from City 
Hall. 
B. The State of Indiana 
While the City has been moribund, the State of Indiana has been 
worse. Perhaps not surprisingly for a state government with such an 
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unusual solicitude for giant corporations, it has in effect served as 
a legal shield for violations of the water pollution laws by U.S. 
Steel.48 Even though Indiana does have the power to regulate water 
pollution, its statute is relatively weak. 49 
More significantly, the State Board lacks both the funding and 
the impetus to effectively enforce the water pollution regulations, 
and as a result few violators have been prosecuted. 50 Not until the 
federal government passed the 1965 Water Quality Act did the Indi-
ana Stream Pollution Board even begin to go through the motions 
of obtaining industrial compliance with the Indiana LawY 
U.S. Steel officials have expressed the highest regard for the Indi-
ana Stream Pollution Control Board; an understandable reaction 
given its behavior.52 It took the Board almost two years after the 
1965 Federal Lake Michigan Water Quality Conference to promul-
gate specific water quality criteria for the Grand Calumet River. 
These criteria were lax. Limits were placed on discharges of dis-
solved solids, ammonia-nitrate, and phenol; but no limits were 
placed on iron particles or cyanide, and those on suspended solids 
and oil were completely inadequate.53 
U.S. Steel was then, and still remains, in violation of these stan-
dards. After three years the Indiana Board decided to hold a hearing 
on the matter. On August 20, 1970 this procedure culminated in an 
order that U.S. Steel cease discharging "raw and inadequately 
treated waste water" into the Grand Calumet River; and that it 
"institute at once the necessary procedures for the construction of 
additional waste treatment facilities needed to eliminate the pollu-
tion of waters." The Corporation was to be given 18 months to carry 
out the construction work. 54 U.S. Steel's response to the first legal 
demand that it stop polluting since it built the Gary Works was to 
request a rehearing, at which time the Board reaffirmed its order. 
On appeal U.S. Steel pointed out that the Board had made numer-
ous vital errors in its conduct - including its failure to take a 
transcript at the initial hearing. The Superior Court reversed and 
remanded the case to the Board which ordered a new hearing. 55 
This court decision was due to the Board's inadequate case, not 
a pro-industry bias by the Court. For at virtually the same time, the 
same court upheld a far stronger order of the Gary Air Pollution 
Review Board with respect to Gary Works' air pollution.56 
Thus, in April, 1971, the State of Indiana found itself beginning 
its laborious enforcement proceeding against U.S. Steel. The Cor-
poration's position at this de novo hearing was: "We all pollute."57 
Since that time, the State has taken no further actions leading to 
binding orders against U.S. Steel. 58 
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C. Federal Regulatory Authorities 
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act59 
The failure of the federal government to stop Gary Works' water 
pollution rests on a complex interaction of laws, administrative reg-
ulations, and bureaucratic decisions. The outcome, however, has 
been similar to that of local and state efforts. 
There are two main federal laws which deal with water pollution: 
the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act (The Refuse Act),60 which re-
mained dormant for many years, and the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1948, which was amended in 1956, 1961, 1965, 1970 
and 1972. The initial Water Pollution Act was completely ineffec-
tive due to an absence of viable enforcement procedures and the fact 
that it gave the states veto power over potential federal enforcement 
proceedings. The 1956 and 1961 amendments resulted in no signifi-
cant ch:mges. 61 
The 1965 Amendments created "water quality standards"62 which 
were jointly determined by the state and federal authorities. How-
ever, the process of determining these standards was so complex 
that several state standards were still not set in 1972. 63 Moreover, 
these standards did not forbid industrial pollution but only called 
for a reduction in its amount, and they allowed for a lengthy time 
lag. 
Nor did the 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act fundamentally 
alter this situation. Water quality standards were still promulgated 
by the states; and the mechanisms of enforcement remained too 
elaborate to be readily workable. In fact, until the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Justice Department had pro-
secuted only one case under the 1970 Amendments. 64 
With this background in mind, it is not surprising to discover that 
the actions taken by the federal government to stop Gary Works' 
pollution under the Water Pollution Control Act were quite limited. 
In March, 1965, the federal government convened a Conference on 
Lake Michigan pollution. The purpose of this Conference was for 
the federal and state governments to jointly determine Calumet 
area "water quality standards" and set a time table for compliance 
with these standards. 
The standard of compliance was the extremely lax set of regula-
tions of the State of Indiana, and u.S. Steel was given three 
years-until December 31, 1968-to take some significant action 
regarding pollution.65 During this grace period, the Gary Works did 
nothing to improve its overall effluent discharge patterns. 66 The 
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federal government then granted U.S. Steel a one year extension. 
In January, 1969 another Conference was held to see how matters 
were proceeding. At this time U.S. Steel obtained a second one year 
extension'until December 31, 1970. In December, 1970 it "was de-
manding new extensions and making no pretense of intending to 
cooperate with the original requirements."67 No enforcement action 
was taken by the federal authorities under the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act. 
2. The 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act 
Faced with the rising national clamor about water pollution, the 
Justice Department filed a criminal suit against the Gary Works in 
February of 1970 under the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act. 6s 
Unlike the complex 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, the 1899 Act simply forbids any discharge of mate-
rials into navigable rivers of the United States. It has strong enforce-
ment provisions, including immediate injunctions and stiff fines for 
violators. Moreover, the Supreme Court has given the statute a very 
expanded interpretation. Discharging materials was held to include 
all unlicensed discharges of refuse except municipal sewage. This 
essentially meant that all industrial water pollution was illegal. The 
only way one could legally pollute was to obtain a permit from the 
Army Corps of Engineers.69 
Initially, it appeared that the February, 1970 suit was a giant step 
forward. 70 On June 8, 1972, the Corporation was found guilty and 
fined $5,000.71 It is worth noting that the amount of the fine was 
clearly far less than the cost of pollution control equipment to pre-
vent the discharge; and that over four years had elapsed between 
the alleged offense and conviction. Even more significantly, the 
indictment was not based upon U.S. Steel's continual and massive 
water pollution. It was simply that on one specific day, October 11, 
1967, discharges from two sewers opening into the Grand Calumet 
had occurred: one pipe discharging "a significant quantity of a red-
brown substance," and the other "an oily substance."72 
This narrowly drawn indictment presaged a determined - and 
successful- effort by the Nixon Administration to prevent the 1899 
Act from being utilized to halt water pollution. It was clear that the 
Administration considered the law too powerful a weapon against 
polluters; and steps were rapidly taken to emasculate it.73 During 
the period when the Gary Works case was initiated, a large number 
of United States District Attorneys were commencing actions under 
the promising 1899 Act, and it seemed likely to revolutionize water 
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pollution enforcement. 74 
On June 13, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell sent all 
U.S. District Attorneys a set of enforcement guidelines for the 1899 
Act. 75 These guidelines essentially generalized the Gary precedent. 
District Attorneys were told not to prosecute any industry causing 
pollution "of a continuing nature;" only exceptional discharges -
such as accidental oil spills not attendant to regular produc-
tion-were to be subject to enforcement under the 1899 law. The 
regular discharge of industrial effluents was only to be attacked via 
the Water Pollution Control Act. 76 
This peculiar set of guidelines was greeted by a storm of protests 
by environmentalists.77 The Justice Department's alleged reason 
was that any other course of action would interfere with the require-
ments of the Water Pollution Control Act. Eventually, the opposi-
tion to these guidelines became so intense that they were rescinded, 
although the second set was also quite restrictive. 7S Under this sec-
ond set of guidelines promulgated on February 4, 1971, District 
Attorneys were not to initiate suits on their own, but were to wait 
for referrals from the Environmental Protection Agency.79 Appar-
ently, there was substantial internal opposition by various U.S. Dis-
trict Attorneys to this requirement and on one occasion it was neces-
sary to fire a District Attorney who insisted on being overly zealous 
in his efforts to stop pollution.so 
In February, 1971, the U.S. District Attorney filed a civil suit 
against the Gary Works under the 1899 Act, charging the Corpora-
tion with a pattern of continuing discharges of iron, oil, ammonia, 
and solids. This case has not yet come to trial,81 and there is reason 
to anticipate that it never will. First, this case was one of a group 
of 38 cases simultaneously initiated by the Justice Department, 
most of which were settled out of court.82 The only one of the group, 
a case against Armco Steel, which did come to trial resulted in a 
sweeping court order against Armco which was ordered to under-
take major capital improvements to remedy its water pollution. 83 
But the initial court decision of September, 1971, was later modified 
by a consent decree. (There have been charges made in Congress 
that political interference at the highest Administration level re-
sulted in a capitulation to the steel company; these charges have 
been denied, but the relevant documents have not been made avail-
able by the Administration to its Congressional critics.)84 
On December 23, 1970, President Nixon reactivated the 1899 Re-
fuse Act by ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to begin imple-
menting the heretofore unenforced section of the 1899 Act requiring 
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all industries discharging into the nation's waters to obtain a per-
mit.X• Under the regulations issued by the Corps in July, 1971, the 
application had to be approved by both the appropriate state pollu-
tion control agency and the Environmental Protection Agency. If 
both bodies approved the Corps would issue a five year permit.86 
Unfortunately, this set of procedures virtually made a dead letter 
of the 1899 Act. The basis for state approval of the permit applica-
tion is the existing "water quality standards" under the Water Pol-
lution Control Act.X7 (Thus for the Gary Works, it is the inadequate 
standards of the Indiana Stream Pollution Control Board.)88 Then 
Director William Ruckelshaus admitted that EPA approval would 
be a formality; that ordinarily his agency would simply follow the 
state guidelines. xu The effect was to radically increase the amount 
of paperwork and forms, while making the actual change in the real 
world of sewer discharges less likely. DO 
At first, U.S. Steel decided not to abide by the permit program 
requirements. Although it submitted an application in time for the 
July, 1971 deadline, it refused to sign the certification to it in keep-
ing with its overall strategy of maximum delay.91 However, in Octo-
ber U.S. Steel changed its mind and agreed to sign its application. 
Apparently, the Corporation had failed to get the other major steel 
companies to join it in a court challenge of the law; it also had made 
itself the target of EPA demands on the Justice Department to 
proceed with the Gary Works suit pending against it.D2 
However, the permit program soon began to collapse under its 
own weight as it proved impossible to adequately review the 40,000 
applications which had been filed. (U.S. Steel's application for the 
Gary Works alone was over 500 pages.)D3 Few of the applications 
were granted; but while they were pending, legal action against 
industrial polluters was also held in abeyance. 94 
3. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
Under the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, the existing permit applications under the 1899 Act are 
automatically transferred and become applications for permits 
under the new law.95 Not only do the practical problems of process-
ing the permit application remain, but anyone who applied for such 
a permit is immune from prosecution under the new law until these 
applications are processed.96 This transitional problem, however, is 
not the core of the difficulty with the new law,97 rather it is its 
administrative complexity. The 1972 Act sets three different sets of 
effluent standards: "best practicable control technology currently 
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available" (1977); "best available technology economically achieva-
ble" (1983); and separate provisions for new plants. There is a set 
of criteria for the Environmental Protection Agency to utilize in 
setting these standards,98 but these criteria are so diverse that the 
EPA is really delegated essentially arbitrary powers in its decision-
making.90 
These standards are to be translated into a series of regulations 
determining discharge levels for different industry groups. (These 
regulations are currently being issued.) Individual permits are to be 
granted or denied depending upon whether they measure up to these 
regulations. 100 
Finally, the granting of permits can be turned over to the states, 
if they develop an adequate set of guidelines themselves. 'o, However, 
the EPA guidelines for determining whether a state program is ade-
quate are untested and highly complex-leading to further uncer-
tainties. ,02 
Rather than guaranteeing rapid progress on the water pollution 
front, recent legal and administrative developments seem to have 
had the effect of adding additional complexities which can readily 
be turned into opportunities for political maneuvering and proce-
dural delay by determined industrial polluters. In any event, in the 
short run, U.S. Steel has avoided being placed in a position where 
it must engage in massive changes in its production processes. 
III. STRATEGY OF UNITED STATES STEEL 
Strategically, the aim of the U.S. Steel Corporation has been to 
resist making substantial investments-either in new capital or in 
operating costs-for pollution control measures. 103 For the Gary 
Works alone, it is possible that expenditures of several hundred 
million dollars would be necessary to reduce water pollution to cur-
rent statutory levels. ,04 By postponing these expenditures for a de-
cade or more (instead of voluntarily complying with the aims of the 
existing environmental laws), the Corporation has made substantial 
sums of capital available for other, profitable, investments. Yet, it 
is interesting to note that in 1969 the Secretary of the Interior 
awarded Edgar Speer, the President of U.S. Steel, with a "special 
clean water award. "105 
On the other hand, the need for some controls over the environ-
ment has become clear to both the federal government and to busi-
ness leaders. So the problem, particularly for industries such as 
steel, which are not terribly profitable and which face high costs for 
pollution control equipment, is how to avoid paying for amelioration 
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of the problem out of their own profits. The answer is to pass the 
cost on to the American people. lu6 
To the extent that the tax laws are changed to "provide incen-
tives" for private industry to install pollution control equipment, 107 
what is actually happening is that the population at large is provid-
ing a subsidy to the enterprise for this installation. lOS In the late 
1960's when it became obvious that substantial expenditures for 
environmental protection would eventually have to be made, U.S. 
Steel and other major polluters successfully campaigned to shift a 
large part of the cost from the stockholders to the public generally. 
Thus, in the past few years the following measures have been 
adopted: 
1. The federal government amended Section 169 of the Internal 
Revenue Code to provide for rapid depreciation (i.e. five years) of 
pollution control equipment. The steel industry was a prime mover 
behind this amendment. lu9 
2. Despite the objections of the Department of the Treasury, 
Section 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code permits pollution con-
trol investments to be covered by the floating of special tax exempt 
industrial development bonds. This appreciably reduces the inter-
est rates, and hence the net costs, of the capital involved. Sales of 
these bonds have already surpassed $1 billion a year. In these cases 
the issuing corporation can also deduct depreciation and investment 
tax credits as if it owned the facilities outright, even though title is 
vested in the issuing municipality yo Through these and similar tax 
devices, between 1969 and 1971 U.S. Steel in all probability paid no 
federal taxes. lll 
In addition, state governments (forced to compete against each 
other for industry) have matched this federal largesse. Indiana abol-
ished all taxes, including local property taxes, on expenditures 
made for pollution control equipment. 112 In Indiana, the determina-
tion of what facilities qualify is vested in the Indiana Stream Pollu-
tion Control Board,113 and Indiana's Attorney General has in-
structed the Board to interpret this statute with extreme liberal-
ity,,14 Once such a facility has been so certified, the Township Asses-
sor determines how much value can be deducted from the local tax 
bill. 115 In Gary, this official has long had an amicable relationship 
with U.S. Steel. l16 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the vast resources available to U.S. Steel, local and 
state governments are virtually impotent. ll7 The experiences of the 
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City of Gary in attempting to control the Corporation under the 
reform administration of Mayor Richard Hatcher amply bear out 
this conclusion, and the federal government seems unwilling to 
bring its power to bear. The outcome is that U.S. Steel has not been 
brought to heel; it continues to ride roughshod over the public inter-
est as it has since its birth at the turn of the century. 
-·--«~t~·­
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